Defending Substantivism About Disputes In The Metaphysics Of Composition
Miller (Kristie)
Source: Journal of Philosophy 111 (9-10), 2014:529-556
Paper - Abstract

Paper Summary


Author’s Abstract

  1. This paper defends substantivism about disputes in the metaphysics of composition.
  2. That is, it defends the view that disputes about the metaphysics of composition are substantial: they are neither merely apparent disputes in which disputants are talking past one another in virtue of disagreeing about the truth conditions for certain sentences; nor are they disputes in which there is no fact of the matter in the world in virtue of which one party to the dispute is right and the other(s) wrong.

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