<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Catterson (Troy) - Changing the subject: on the subject of subjectivity (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_23/PaperSummary_23099.htm">Changing the subject: on the subject of subjectivity</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/C/Author_Catterson (Troy).htm">Catterson (Troy)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Synthese, Vol. 162, No. 3 (Jun., 2008), pp. 385-404</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=600><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_23/PaperSummary_23099.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_23/PaperCitings_23099.htm">Books / Papers Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><U>Author s Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>In this paper I shall attempt to argue for the <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1139.htm">simple view</A><SUP>1</SUP> of personal identity. </li><li>I shall first argue that we often do have warrant for our beliefs that we exist as continuing subjects of experience, and that these beliefs are justified independently of any reductionist analysis of what it means to be a person. </li><li>This has two important implications that are relevant to the ongoing debate concerning the number of persons that are in existence throughout any duration in time: <ol type="i"><li>The lack of logically or metaphysically necessary and sufficient conditions for distinguishing one person from another should imply neither that there is only one person nor that personhood is not individuative; and </li><li>The lack of such universally applicable identity criteria should not imply that the term 'person' is a folk term with no real application. </ol></li><li>In other words, lack of reductionist analysis does not entail lack of existence. </li></ol></FONT><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T10:02" pubdate>02/08/2018 10:02:48</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>