- What Animalism1 Does and Doesn’t Say
- Arguments for Animalism2
→ Thinking Animal Argument3
→ Animal Ancestors Argument
- Death and Immortality
- This paper comes from a book Philosophy for Us4.
- The Chapter starts with a motivation for animalism5 with a ruse where the death and subsequent decay of a 10-year-old at the teeth of a grizzly bear is described in detail, until6 it is revealed that the individual is an elk.
- Blatti claims that the reader had no difficulty imagining himself the subject of this drama, thereby imagining that he was:-
- The evolutionary7 descendent of animals,
- A creature with a biological life,
- A creature subject to the same diseases8 and predations as other animals,
- An organism that ceases to exist at death, and
- The progenitor of a corpse9 subsequently consumed by other animals and bacteria.
- We had no difficulty imagining ourselves in this story, despite all the above being characteristics of an animal.
- Blatti seems to suggest that we’ve been imaging ourselves as an elk – so how much easier to imagine ourselves as human animals10. But this is nonsense – we didn’t imagine ourselves as elks, but as human beings facing death and decay.
- Blatti tries to milk this delusion, mistakenly in my view. To be clear: we didn’t know this drama involved an elk until we were told. So, we never thought of ourselves as an elk, or as “inhabiting an elk’s body”. So, the story doesn’t show either that we are animals or that we might be non-animals inhabiting an animal body (our own, considered as separate to “us”).
- But, Blatti is right – the idea of “inhabiting” one’s body is a popular idea. So, in this case:-
→ Just what would your nature be? An immaterial soul?
→ How is the “inhabiting” supposed to work?
But, more importantly (he says),
→ what would happen to “the elk itself”, from its perspective, if this took place?
- Blatti is right to press this Thought Experiment11. His point is that maybe there’s no “elk itself” to be displaced, or have its body shared with a human interloper. But if the elk just is its body, why isn’t the
- What Animalism12 Does and Doesn’t Say
- Arguments for Animalism13
- Death and Immortality
- There is much to recommend organic animalism15, not least that it jibes with many of our practices and concerns regarding the dead and beliefs regarding our nonexistence. We describe the deceased as being “gone.” At a funeral service for a deceased loved one, we do not fret that we are burying her when we bury her corpse16 or cremate her remains. Friends and family do not rush to death beds for no reason: the moment when one of us dies is a moment of great consequence. How could anyone deny that you will cease to exist whenever you breathe your last breath?
- Well, imagine the moment when your grandfather eventually passes away: his heart rate slows, his blood pressure drops, his breathing becomes increasingly shallower, until finally, quietly, he expires. Now imagine the very next moment after that. What do you see on the hospital bed? Not your grandfather, according to organic animalism17, for he quite literally disappeared from the realm of existence the moment before. Nor, even, do you see a human animal18, as strictly speaking, on this view, there is no such thing as a “dead animal.”
- This has struck some animalists19 as an implausible upshot of organic animalism20. To be sure, they say, death is a significant moment, but nothing literally goes out of existence when it occurs. Accordingly, and in contrast to organic animalism’s21 claim that continued life is both sufficient and necessary for human persistence, those who endorse “somatic animalism”22 — so called because it emphasizes the bodily aspects of the human animal23 — deny that continued life is necessary. On this view, a human animal24 persists just in case its parts remain sufficiently intact as to be apt for life. In other words, vital processes like metabolism and respiration need not actually continue for an organism to persist. All that is required is that the internal structure of its body remain organized enough as to be explicable only by appeal to the animal body’s being, or having once been, alive. What this means in the case of your imaginary grandfather is that he quite literally survives his own death: he continues existing even after all of his vital functions cease.
- In this way, somatic animalism25 can, whilst organic animalism26 cannot, countenance the possibility of postmortem survival. It is interesting, then, that both views can allow for the possibility of immortality. If, immediately after dying, your grandfather was cryogenically preserved in a way that maintained the functional organization of his body’s internal structure, then according to somatic animalism27, he would properly be said to persist so long as he remained in this state — perhaps forever. Likewise, according to organic animalism28, if it were possible to induce human animals29 into a protracted state of hibernation — wherein one’s vital processes are slowed dramatically without stopping, but where this state is maintained indefinitely — we could achieve “eternal life” of a kind. Neither organic nor somatic animalism30 could accommodate the religious idea of persisting eternally as an immaterial being in heaven or hell. But nor does either view rule out the possibility of immortality altogether.
- Philosophy for Us is a fairly general undergraduate introduction to “doing” philosophy. The chapters are by some famous names, and the book looks to be of good quality, but is necessarily of an elementary level.
- It is somewhat brief, and inordinately expensive, though a positive is that it was recenty published - in Novenber 2017 (by Cognella Inc.).
- As I don't intend to buy it, I note its virtues and contents here.
- I only have two of the papers - this one by Blatti, and that by Oppy.
- The Editor’s introduction reads as follows:-
- When selecting a textbook instructors of introductory philosophy courses face a dilemma. On one horn is the lamentable fact that many introductory college students are incapable of reading and comprehending original philosophical texts, whether these texts be classics of the ancient or modern periods, or more contemporary works. That such texts are inaccessible to introductory students is not necessarily indicative of a shortcoming on the part of the students: original texts are written by philosophers and for philosophers, and thus they often presuppose a lot of specialized background knowledge and use many unfamiliar archaic and/or technical terms. On the other horn is the widely accepted pedagogical attitude that learning philosophy requires doing philosophy; the pedagogical goals of most instructors of introductory philosophy courses primarily concern the development of critical thinking skills, and only secondarily concern acquiring knowledge of significant philosophical theories. Achieving this primary goal of developing students’ critical thinking skills is not well served by texts that merely attempt to summarize, from “an objective point of view,” the opinions and theories of influential philosophical figures. Rather, achieving the primary goal seems to require engaging with texts that are written with the objective of persuading the reader to adopt a particular philosophical position.
- Philosophy for Us resolves this dilemma. This anthology contains short papers written by philosophers who really endorse the views they arguing in support of, but the papers are written for contemporary introductory students. Thus all technical terms are defined when they are introduced, and no familiarity with other philosophical texts is presupposed. The result is a collection of short papers that introductory students will find both comprehensible, and, I hope, philosophically engaging.
- The text consists of five sections, each of which is devoted to a different philosophical issue. The issues addressed are all comprehensible to introductory students; they are the kinds of issue that minimally reflective students will have already thought about, though perhaps not in a careful and systematic way. Each section begins with a very brief introduction presenting a philosophical issue, followed by 2–4 short papers addressing it. Each paper is written by a contemporary philosopher who is attempting to establish a particular philosophical position with regard to the issue. As the positions defended in the papers are incompatible, students are compelled to engage in the process of critical inquiry and determine which of these positions—if any—they themselves endorse. The objective of Philosophy for Us is to motivate and inspire introductory students to do philosophy.
- Does God Exist? 1
- "Oppy (Graham) - An Argument for Atheism From Naturalism" - 3
→ Graham Oppy, Monash University
- The Case for Divine Creation from Cosmic Fine-tuning - 15
→ Robin Collins, Messiah College
- An a Priori Argument for the Existence of God: The Ontological Argument - 25
→ Trent Dougherty, Baylor University
- Do We Have Free Will? 37
- An Argument for Free Will Skepticism - 39
→ Derek Pereboom, Cornell University
- Agent Causation and Free Will: A Case for Libertarianism - 49
→ Thad Botham, Arizona State University
- A Compatibilist Account of Free Will - 59
→ Tomis Kapitan, Northern Illinois University
- What Am I? 71
- "Blatti (Stephan) - We Are Animals" - 73
→ Stephan Blatti, University of Maryland
- The Psychological Approach to Personal Identity - 83
→ Marya Schechtman, University of Illinois at Chicago
- On Behalf of Mind-Body Dualism - 91
→ William Hasker, Huntington University
- An Argument for Eliminativism Regarding Persons - 99
→ Jim Stone, University of New Orleans
- Are There Objective Moral Truths? 111
- Morality from God - 113
→ Christian Miller, Wake Forest University
- In Defense of Theism-Independent Moral Realism - 125
→ Erik Wielenberg, DePauw University (for Wielenberg , see "Morriston (Wes) - Omnipotence and the Power to Choose: A Reply to Wielenberg")
- The Unbelievable Truth About Morality - 135
→ Bart Streumer, University of Groningen
- A Brief Explanation and Defense of Expressivism - 145
→ Steven Daskal, Northern Illinois University (for Daskal, see "McKenzie (Peter) - The Christians: Their Practices and Beliefs"?)
- Is It Morally Permissible To Eat Meat? 155
- The Commonsense Case for Ethical Vegetarianism: Why It Is Morally Wrong to Eat Animals - 157
→ Mylan Engel Jr., Northern Illinois University
- Some Permissible Meat Eating - 169
→ Ted Warfield, University of Notre Dame
- Actually, the game is given away when it is remarked that “your animal ancestry can be traced back more than 12 million years to East Asia”.
- The hero’s mother had died of a wasting disease, progressive encephalopathy.
- See this Note.
- But, as noted previously, we didn’t imagine ourselves as elks in the first place, though maybe this doesn’t matter. He could have asked us to do so and we might have thought we’d succeeded.
- That said, there’s a tradition of denying we can do any such thing – consider Nagel’s bat and Wittgenstein’s lion.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2020
- Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)