Animalism (SEP)
Blatti (Stephan)
Source: Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, First published Mon Apr 7, 2014
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Introduction

  1. Among the questions to be raised under the heading of “personal identity” are these:
    → “What are we1?” (fundamental nature question) and
    → “Under what conditions do we persist through time?” (persistence question).
  2. Against the dominant neo-Lockean approach to these questions, the view known as animalism2 answers that each of us is an organism of the species Homo sapiens and that the conditions of our persistence are those of animals.
  3. Beyond describing the content and historical background of animalism3 and its rivals, this entry explores some of the arguments for and objections to this controversial account of our nature and persistence.

Sections
  1. Formulating Animalism4
    → 1.1 Our Fundamental Nature
    → 1.2 Our Persistence
  2. The Lockean Legacy
    → 2.1 Locke's Human/Person Distinction
    → 2.2 Animalism5 and the Human/Person Distinction
    → 2.3 Animalism(s)6 vs. Neo-Lockeanism(s)
  3. Arguments for and Objections to Animalism7
    → 3.1 Thinking Animal Argument8
    → 3.2 Replies to the Thinking Animal Argument9
    → 3.3 Animal Ancestors Argument
    → 3.4 Further Objections, Implications, and Questions
  4. Bibliography

Comment:

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Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

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  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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