- This paper is about a puzzle concerning the metaphysics of material objects: a puzzle generated by cases where material objects appear to coincide, sharing all their matter. As is well known, it can be illustrated by the example of a statue. In front of me now, sitting on my desk, is a (small) statue – a statue of a lion. The statue is made of clay. So in front of me now is a piece of clay. But what is the relation between the statue and the piece of clay? Are they identical, or are they distinct?
- In this paper, I do the following.
- First, in §§2 and 3 I set out some cases of coincidence, and some responses to the cases.
- In the remainder of the paper, I focus on the opposition between two of these responses:
For reasons that will be clear, I call the first response ‘pluralism’, and the second response ‘intermediate monism’. I make no secret of the fact that my sympathies are with the pluralist.
- the one standardly given by the endurantist about persistence, and
- the one standardly given by the perdurantist about persistence.
- In §6 I raise what seems to me to be a serious problem for the intermediate monist’s account – i.e., for the account standardly given by the perdurantist.
- In the final sections of the paper (§§ 7–10) I defend the pluralist view against some objections.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
- Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)