<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>So (Paul) - Lewis Personal Identity (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_23/PaperSummary_23364.htm">Lewis Personal Identity</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/S/Author_So (Paul).htm">So (Paul)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Academia.edu: "Compos Mentis"</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=400><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_23/PaperSummary_23364.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_23/PapersToNotes_23364.htm">Notes Citing this Paper</A></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><u>Author s Abstract</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>In their debate about personal identity, Derek Parfit (<a name="1"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_325.htm">Parfit (Derek) - Personal Identity</A>", 1971) thinks that our common sense notion of personal identity cannot be preserved, since formal identity fails to preserve it in the fission paradox scenario; David Lewis (<a name="2"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_113.htm">Lewis (David) - Survival and Identity</A>", 1976) thinks that it can be preserved with tense-identity, according to which two continuant persons C1 and C2 are tense identical at T1 iff they share the same person stages at T1. </li><li>I argue that Lewis notion of tense identity falls short of its intended goal to capture our common sense notion of personal identity, which is committed to numerical identity, not mere qualitative identity. </li><li>Whereas for Lewis, two continuant persons C1 and C2 are prima facie numerically identical insofar as they are indiscernible, sharing the same person-stages, this indiscernibility relation between C1 and C2 only makes them qualitatively identical, rather than actually numerically identical. </li></ol></FONT><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T10:06" pubdate>02/08/2018 10:06:38</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>