Hard-Incompatibilist Existentialism: Neuroscience, Punishment, and Meaning in Life
Pereboom (Derek) & Caruso (Gregg D.)
Source: Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age of Neuroscience, eds. Gregg D. Caruso and Owen Flanagan, pp.193-222. New York: Oxford University Press.
Paper - Abstract

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Authors' Introduction

  1. As philosophical and scientific arguments for free will skepticism continue to gain traction, we are likely to see a fundamental shift in the way people think about free will and moral responsibility. Such shifts raise important practical and existential concerns: What if we came to disbelieve in free will? What would this mean for our interpersonal relationships, society, morality, meaning, and the law? What would it do to our standing as human beings? Would it cause nihilism and despair, as some maintain, or would it rather have a humanizing effect on our practices and policies, freeing us from the negative effects of belief in free will? In this chapter, we consider the practical implications of free will skepticism and argue that life without free will and basic desert moral responsibility would not be as destructive as many people believe. We argue that prospects of finding meaning in life or of sustaining good interpersonal relationships, for example, would not be threatened. On treatment of criminals, we argue that although retributivism and severe punishment, such as the death penalty, would be ruled out, preventive detention and rehabilitation programs would still be justified. While we will touch on all these issues herein, our focus will be primarily on this last issue.
  2. We begin in Section 1 by considering two different routes to free will skepticism. The first denies the causal efficacy of the types of willing required for free will and receives its contemporary impetus from pioneering work in neuroscience by Benjamin Libet, Daniel Wegner, and John Dylan Haynes. The second, which is more common in the philosophical literature, does not deny the causal efficacy of the will but instead claims that whether this causal efficacy is deterministic or indeterministic, it does not achieve the level of control to count as free will by the standards of the historical debate. We argue that while there are compelling objections to the first route (e.g., Al Mele [2009], Eddy Nahmias [2002, 2011], and Neil Levy [2005]), the second route to free will skepticism remains intact.
  3. In Section 2, we argue that free will skepticism allows for a workable morality and, rather than negatively impacting our personal relationships and meaning in life, may well improve our well-being and our relationships to others since it would tend to eradicate an often destructive form of moral anger.
  4. In Section 3, we argue that free will skepticism allows for adequate ways of responding to criminal behavior — in particular, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and alternation of relevant social conditions — and that these methods are both morally justified and sufficient for good social policy. We present and defend our own preferred model for dealing with dangerous criminals, an incapacitation account built on the right to self-protection analogous to the justification for quarantine (see Pereboom 2001, 2013, 2014a; Caruso 2016a), and we respond to recent objections to it by Michael Corrado and John Lemos.

Comment:

See Pereboom & Caruso - Hard-Incompatibilist Existentialism.

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