Intentionality and the Non-Psychological
Martin (C.B.) & Pfeifer (Karl)
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Jun., 1986), pp. 531-554
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsBooks / Papers Citing this PaperDisclaimer


Authors’ Introduction

  1. We will show that the most typical characterizations of intentionality, including those discussed by William Lycan in his article "On 'Intentionality' and the Psychological," and also Lycan's own suggested characterization and John Searle's more extended treatments of the concept all fail to distinguish intentional mental states from non-intentional dispositional physical states. Accepting any of these current accounts will be to take a quick road to panpsychism!
  2. The cases and arguments we develop are not meant merely to show up errors and inadequacies but are meant to show in detail how the persistent and widespread failure to distinguish between intentionality and non-intentional causal dispositionality has compromised much recent work (including that of Searle's) on intentionality. The clear need to make such a distinction should provide a direction for future work on the subject.

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



© Theo Todman, June 2007 - Jan 2019. Please address any comments on this page to theo@theotodman.com. File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page