Intentionality and the Physical: A New Theory of Disposition Ascription
Mumford (Stephen)
Source: Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 49, No. 195 (Apr., 1999), pp. 215-225
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Introduction

  1. This paper has three aims.
    1. First, it aims to stress the importance of the dispositional / categorical distinction in the light of the evident failure of the traditional formulation.
    2. Second, it considers one radical new alternative that is on offer, intentionality as the mark of the dispositional, and shows what is unacceptable about it.
    3. Finally, a suggestion is made of what would be a better theory that explains all that was appealing about the new alternative.

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