A Meinongian Analysis of Fictional Objects
Parsons (Terence)
Source: Grazer Philosophische Studien, Volume 1: Issue 1, 1975, pp. 73-86
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Introduction

  1. While it's possible to construct a clear and consistent version of Meinong's theory of objects, why should it be accepted?
  2. The only reason we ever get to accept a metaphysical theory is that it has many interesting applications.
  3. As Meinong's theory does not differ from other theories in its treatment of existing objects, it can only prove its value in its treatment on non-existent objects, and in particular here, to fictional objects.
  4. "Fictional" here means "occurring in fiction". Some objects that occur in fiction do also actually exist.

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