|Intentionality as the Mark of the Dispositional|
|Source: Dialectica, Vol. 50, No. 2 (1996), pp. 91-120|
|Paper - Abstract|
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→ "Searle (John) - Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind"'s (1983) directedness and
→ "Anscombe (G.E.M.) - The Intentionality of Sensation: A Grammatical Feature"’s (1965) indeterminacy,
are features which distinguish T-intenTional / dispositional states, both mental and non-mental (physical), from non-dispositional "categorical" states.
→ Chisholm's (1957) permissible falsity of a prepositional attitude ascription,
a feature of linguistic utterances too restricted in its scope to be of interest, or, as in the case of
→ Frege's (1892) indirect reference / Quine's (1953) referential opacity,
evidence that the S-intenSional locution is a quotation either of what someone has said in the past or might be expected to say, if the question were to arise at some time in the future.
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