Intentionality as the Mark of the Dispositional
Place (U.T.)
Source: Dialectica, Vol. 50, No. 2 (1996), pp. 91-120
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Summary

  1. "Martin (C.B.) & Pfeifer (Karl) - Intentionality and the Non-Psychological" (1986) have claimed "that the most typical characterizations of intentionality ... all fail to distinguish . . . mental states from . . . dispositional physical states."
  2. The evidence they present in support of this thesis is examined in the light of the possibility that what it shows is that intentionality is the mark, not of the mental, but of the dispositional.
  3. Of the five marks of intentionality they discuss a critical examination shows that three of them, → Brentano's (1874) inexistence of the intentional object,
    "Searle (John) - Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind"'s (1983) directedness and
    "Anscombe (G.E.M.) - The Intentionality of Sensation: A Grammatical Feature"’s (1965) indeterminacy,
    are features which distinguish T-intenTional / dispositional states, both mental and non-mental (physical), from non-dispositional "categorical" states.
  4. The other two are either, as in the case of
    → Chisholm's (1957) permissible falsity of a prepositional attitude ascription,
    a feature of linguistic utterances too restricted in its scope to be of interest, or, as in the case of
    → Frege's (1892) indirect reference / Quine's (1953) referential opacity,
    evidence that the S-intenSional locution is a quotation either of what someone has said in the past or might be expected to say, if the question were to arise at some time in the future.

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