- "Rosen (Gideon) - Modal Fictionalism" (1990) aims to secure the benefits of realism about possible-worlds, whilst avoiding commitment to the existence of any world other than our own.
- "Rosen (Gideon) - A Problem for Fictionalism about Possible Worlds" (1993) and "Brock (Stuart) - Modal Fictionalism: A Response to Rosen" (1993) both argue that fictionalism1 is self-defeating since the fictionalist is tacitly committed to the existence of a plurality of worlds.
- In this paper, I develop a new strategy for the fictionalist to pursue in response to the Brock-Rosen objection.
- I begin by arguing that modal fictionalism2 is best understood as a paraphrase strategy that concerns the propositions that are expressed, in a given context, by modal sentences.
- I go on to argue that what is interesting about paraphrastic fictionalism3 is that it allows the fictionalist to accept that the sentence 'there is a plurality of worlds' is true without thereby committing her to the existence of a plurality of worlds.
- I then argue that the paraphrastic fictionalist can appeal to a form of semantic contextualism in order to communicate her status as an anti-realist.
- Finally, I generalise my conception of fictionalism4 and argue that "Nolan (Daniel) & O'Leary-Hawthorne (John) - Reflexive Fictionalisms" (1996) is wrong to suggest that the Brock-Rosen objection reveals a structural flaw with all species of fictionalism5.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
- Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)