- Wright says that any predicate which has certain platitude-sustaining features, F, deserves to count as a truth predicate, and this position "is thus at least in principle open to the possibility of a pluralist view of truth: there may be a variety of notions ... which pass the test" (25). What impact should this view have on Wright's account of the English predicate "true"? One possibility is that it opens the door to treating it as ambiguous: perhaps someone who, operating within Wright's framework, is an anti-realist for one discourse and a realist for another should believe that the sense of "true" as it occurs in the one is the least that does justice to F, whereas the sense of "true" as it occurs in the other is meatier.
- I believe that Wright's text sometimes suggests that this is his view. However, I shall show that no damage would be done to his central theses by rejecting this position, that there is no need for him to adopt it, and that he does better not to. This is intended as a minor friendly emendation (or perhaps clarification).
Footnote 1: Somewhat arbitrarily truncated!
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