Unreflective Realism
Williamson (Timothy)
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 56, No. 4 (Dec., 1996), pp. 905-909
Paper - Abstract

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Author's Abstract

  1. Truth and Objectivity is full of ideas. Only a few of them will be discussed here.
  2. First, I consider the book's use of the notion of the a priori, and raise some problems for it.
  3. The trouble is then diagnosed as resulting from a pre-conception about semantics, one also connected with Wright's claim that, in disputes between realists and their opponents, the burden of proof always lies on the former.
  4. To put it crudely, the preconception is that it is the responsibility of participants in a discourse to fix its status; it attains objectivity only if they do something special to bring that about.
  5. An alternative will be suggested, on which realist content can arise by default.

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