|Review of Wiggins's 'Continuants'|
|Source: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews; 2016.06.10|
|Paper - Abstract|
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If I must allow survival, I am not sure why I am committed to denying that the survivor that emerges from all these goings on is the same human being or the same animal as the one who enters them. It is my strong impression that, while I have always refrained from saying or writing that 'person' is itself a natural kind word, I have insisted on the dependence of the concept of a person upon the concept of a human being. But once you understand what a human being is and what the seat of consciousness is, surely you will not too readily assume that you will know what it is for the human being to be given a new seat of consciousness. If transplantation really were possible, then would not the person follow the seat of consciousness? In that case does not the animal that is the survivor follow it too?
→ "Wiggins (David) - Reply to Snowdon (Persons and Personal Identity)" in "Lovibond (Sabina) & Williams (S.G.) - Identity, Truth & Value: Essays for David Wiggins", p. 246
Footnote 2: Chapter 1: "Wiggins (David) - Identity, Individuation, and Substance".
→ Chapter 4: "Wiggins (David) - The Person as Object of Science, as Subject of Experience, and as Locus of Value", and
→ Chapter 5: "Wiggins (David) - Sameness, Substance, and the Human Person".
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