Author’s Introduction (Excerpted)
- In Religious Studies XXVI (1990) "Noonan (Harold) - The Possibility of Reincarnation" and Charles B. Daniels, 'In Defence of Reincarnation1' severally take issue with my "MacIntosh (J.J.) - Reincarnation and Relativized Identity". Both make valuable points but both, I think, have somewhat missed the point of my original article.
- The point of writing the paper was to note that these familiar objections might seem inapplicable if identity were relativized, and to show that in fact, even when identity is relativized, the objections still obtain. Thus the scope of the paper was explicitly limited to one particular view of reincarnation2: that reincarnation3 could consistently be claimed to occur even when there was a temporal and causal gap between the original person and the putative reincarnatee.
- Moreover, the authors discussed were in agreement that were there to be two equally plausible candidates for the identity title, neither would succeed to it. They were not discussing things such as the so-called 'brain transfer' cases. They were not discussing the Ship of Theseus. They were not discussing amoebae. They were discussing cases where, without postulating any entity which persisted from the pre-mortem to the post-mortem state, we could nonetheless identity a post-mortem putative person with a pre-mortem person.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
- Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)