Changing Metaphysics: What Difference does it Make?
Thomasson (Amie L.)
Source: Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, Volume 82 (Metaphysics) - July 2018, pp. 139-163
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. I have argued elsewhere for a deflationary conception of metaphysics, which takes well-formed metaphysical questions to be answerable using nothing more mysterious than empirical information and descriptive and normative conceptual work.
  2. Here I examine the ways in which our practices of metaphysics should change, if we adopt the deflationary reconception of metaphysics.
  3. Adopting this approach does not mean abandoning metaphysics, but it does lead to important differences regarding which debates and positions are worth taking seriously. It also requires us to re-evaluate which criteria for choosing metaphysical views are appropriate – particularly where debates about existence are concerned.

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