- Quotation: Whether the noneist really can avoid postulating diﬀerent kinds of being – in particular, whether he can explain to those of us who think that the correct answer to the question ‘What exists?’ is ‘Everything’ just how and why our conception of what objects our bound individual variables range over is unduly narrow – is one of the many difficult and delicate questions which I cannot pursue here.
→ Bob Hale: “Into the Abyss”. Philosophia Mathematica 15: 94-110, 2007: p. 95, fn.2
- In this paper I want to claim, ﬁrst, that despite close similarities,
are diﬀerent ontological doctrines. For unlike the latter, the former is ontologically committed to objects that are nonentities. Once one splits ontological from existential commitment, this claim, I guess, is rather uncontroversial.
- noneism (as developed in both Richard Routley Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond. Canberra: Australian National University,1980 and Graham Priest Towards Non-Being: the Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2016) and
- Tim Crane’s (The Objects of Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) psychological reductionism
- Second, however, I want to claim something more controversial; namely, that this ontological interpretation of noneism naturally makes noneism be non-standardly read as a form of allism, to be however appropriately distinguished from a Quinean form of allism in terms of the diﬀerent scope of the overall ontological domain on which the only existential quantiﬁer that there is ranges.
- This may orient a noneist towards a syncretistic view of existence, according to which, appearances notwithstanding, existence as a whole is captured both by means of second-order and by means of ﬁrst-order related notions.
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