Ontological Syncretistic Noneism
Voltolini (Alberto)
Source: Australasian Journal of Logic (15:2) 2018, Article no. 2.5
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsColour-ConventionsDisclaimer


Author’s Abstract

  1. Quotation: Whether the noneist really can avoid postulating different kinds of being – in particular, whether he can explain to those of us who think that the correct answer to the question ‘What exists?’ is ‘Everything’ just how and why our conception of what objects our bound individual variables range over is unduly narrow – is one of the many difficult and delicate questions which I cannot pursue here.
    Bob Hale: “Into the Abyss”. Philosophia Mathematica 15: 94-110, 2007: p. 95, fn.2
  2. In this paper I want to claim, first, that despite close similarities,
    • noneism (as developed in both Richard Routley Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond. Canberra: Australian National University,1980 and Graham Priest Towards Non-Being: the Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2016) and
    • Tim Crane’s (The Objects of Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) psychological reductionism
    are different ontological doctrines. For unlike the latter, the former is ontologically committed to objects that are nonentities. Once one splits ontological from existential commitment, this claim, I guess, is rather uncontroversial.
  3. Second, however, I want to claim something more controversial; namely, that this ontological interpretation of noneism naturally makes noneism be non-standardly read as a form of allism, to be however appropriately distinguished from a Quinean form of allism in terms of the different scope of the overall ontological domain on which the only existential quantifier that there is ranges.
  4. This may orient a noneist towards a syncretistic view of existence, according to which, appearances notwithstanding, existence as a whole is captured both by means of second-order and by means of first-order related notions.

Comment:

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



© Theo Todman, June 2007 - Nov 2019. Please address any comments on this page to theo@theotodman.com. File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page