- In this essay, I attempt to provide answers to the following four queries concerning the metaphysics of early human embryogenesis.
- Following its first cellular fission, is it coherent to claim that one and only one of two "blastomeric" twins of a human zygote is identical with that zygote?
- Following the fusion of two human pre-embryos, is it coherent to claim that one and only one pre-fusion pre-embryo is identical with that post-fusion pre-embryo?
- Does a live human being come into existence only when its brain comes into existence?
- At implantation, does a pre-embryo become a mere part of its mother?
- I argue
- that either if things have quidditative properties or if criterialism is false, then queries (1) and (2) can be answered in the affirmative;
- that in light of recent developments in theories of human death and in light of a more "functional" theory of brains, query (3) can be answered in the negative; and
- that plausible mereological principles require a negative answer to query (4).
Sadly, I don't have a copy of this paper yet!
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