Temporary and Contingent Instantiation as Partial Identity
Baxter (Donald L.M.)
Source: International Journal for Philosophical Studies, 26 (5):763-780 (2018)
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. An apparent objection against my theory of instantiation as partial identity is that identity is necessary, yet instantiation is often contingent.
  2. To rebut the objection, I show how it can make sense that identity is contingent.
  3. I begin by showing how it can make sense that identity is temporary.
  4. I rely heavily on Andre Gallois's formal theory of occasional identity1, but argue that there is a gap in his explanation of how his formalisms make sense that needs to be filled by appeal to my theory of Aspects.

Comment:

See Baxter - Temporary and Contingent Instantiation as Partial Identity.

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