McTaggart's Paradox and the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics
Craig (William Lane)
Source: Analysis, Vol. 58, No. 2 (Apr., 1998), pp. 122-127
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Introduction

  1. McTaggart's Paradox is so well-ploughed a field that one might doubt whether anything fresh can be said about it. But sometimes new light can be shed on a problem by stepping back and seeing it within a conceptual framework which has hitherto gone unnoticed.
  2. For example, David Lewis ("Lewis (David) - Prisoners' Dilemma is a Newcomb Problem", 1979) sought to illuminate the Prisoners' Dilemma by his insight that the puzzle is actually an instance of Newcomb's Paradox.
  3. In the same way, I believe that McTaggart's Paradox is actually a special case of what Lewis has called the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics – a conceptual contextualization of the paradox which, to my knowledge, has gone unnoticed in the philosophical literature. A realization of the proper conceptual context of the paradox will serve to advance our analysis of it.
  4. The Problem of Temporary Intrinsics is the problem of identity and intrinsic change. The question is, how can an object be self-identical at two different times if it possesses different intrinsic properties at those times?
  5. […]


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