Another defence of the priority view
Parfit (Derek)
Source: Utilitas, vol. 24, no. 3 (September, 2012), pp. 399-440
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

This article discusses

  1. the relation between prioritarian and egalitarian principles,
  2. whether and why we need to appeal to both kinds of principle,
  3. how prioritarians can answer various objections, especially those put forward by Michael Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve,
  4. the moral difference between cases in which our acts could affect only one person or two or more people,
  5. veil of ignorance contractualism and utilitarianism,
  6. what prioritarians should claim about cases in which the effects of our acts are uncertain,
  7. the relative moral importance of actual and expectable benefits,
  8. whether people should sometimes be given various chances of receiving benefits, and
  9. principles that appeal to competing claims.

Comment:

For the full text, see Parfit - Another defence of the priority view.

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