Pain for Objectivists: The Case of Matters of Mere Taste
Sobel (David)
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Aug., 2005), pp. 437-457
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsDisclaimer

Author’s Introduction

  1. Can we adequately account for our reasons of mere taste without holding that our desires ground such reasons?
  2. Recently, Scanlon and Derek Parfit have argued that we can, pointing to pleasure and pain as the grounds of such reasons.
  3. In this paper I take issue with each of their accounts.
  4. I conclude that we do not yet have a plausible rival to a desire-based understanding of the grounds of such reasons.

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2020
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)

© Theo Todman, June 2007 - May 2020. Please address any comments on this page to File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page