Johnston’s Puzzle about Personites
Pautz (Adam)
Source:; Comments at APA 2014
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Remark

  1. This was a comment on an early draft of Mark Johnston’s fascinating paper “The problem of personites”1, now published in Nous ("Johnston (Mark) - The Personite Problem: Should Practical Reason Be Tabled?", 2016).
  2. Johnston has since discussed in detail my first style of response – the response concerning “distinct individual” discussed under (1) below – in another paper ("Johnston (Mark) - Personites, Maximality and Ontological Trash", 2016), at p. 211ff.
  3. The basic idea of response is that when ethical principles invoke the idea of “distinct individual” or “same individual”, four-dimensionalists should understand that idea, not in terms of strict identity or distinctness, but in terms of the co-personality relation.


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