- This pseudo-Paper is intended as the mechanism to record time spent on the Note 'Personite1' during my Thesis research, as from May 2019.
- For the actual time recorded, click on "Paper Statistics" above.
Write-up2 (as at 14/07/2019 18:05:46): Personite
- Recently, it has come to my attention that a term of art related to that of Person4 – namely PERSONITE – has been coined by Mark Johnston, though Eric Olson much earlier used the term “subperson5” for the same concept.
- Anyway, a Personite is a temporal part of a person. If personites exist, and have moral status, then ethical problems arise as – for example – one personite gets the punishment for the misdeeds of another.
- Olson – without saying so explicitly – thinks that there are the same sort of problems arising for personites as arise for the Constitution View6. He also distinguishes Linguistic from Moral persons; the former are the references of personal pronouns according to our linguistic conventions, the latter are the appropriate recipients of our moral concerns, and can’t see how we can guarantee these coincide if we allow the existence of personites.
- Personites are also a consequence of Parfit7’s Relation R as a criterion for what matters in persistence, given that its application is vague.
- I doubt there are any more problems with personites than with appear in the problems:-
→ Dion and Theon8,
→ Tibbles the Cat9,
→ The Problem of the Many10,
And the like. It just adds a temporal dimension.
- For a page of Links11 to this Note, Click here.
- Works on this topic that I’ve actually read12 include the following:-
- "Olson (Eric) - Ethics and the Generous Ontology".
- A reading list might start with:-
- "Eklund (Matti) - The Existence of Personites",
- "Johnston (Mark) - The Personite Problem: Should Practical Reason Be Tabled?",
- "Johnston (Mark) - Personites, Maximality and Ontological Trash",
- "Kaiserman (Alexander) - Stage Theory and the Personite Problem",
- "Pautz (Adam) - Johnston’s Puzzle about Personites".
- This is mostly a place-holder13. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list.
- This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (14/07/2019 18:05:46).
- Link to Latest Write-Up Note.
- Olson also considers “cross-persons” – which are aggregates of temporal parts of different persons.
- He is simply adding the temporal dimension to the plenary ontology that allows any gerrymandered aggregate – my nose and the Eifel Tower – to be a “thing”.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019