- Review of The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology by Mark Rowlands.
- One of the latest labels to emerge for anticlassical (or nonCartesian, or postcognitivist) cognitive science is '4E.' The four Es here are the Embodied, Embedded, Enacted, and Extended approaches to cognition. Since there are a number of different, and likely incompatible, lines of thought within the 4E group, more work needs to be done to articulate how the Es can and should fit together.
- Mark Rowlands' newest book addresses this need in a valuable way. He argues, clearly and carefully, for the thesis of the amalgamated mind, which "subsumes both theses of the embodied and the extended mind" (84).
- The thesis of the embedded mind is rejected as being merely a claim about cognition depending causally on the environment. As such, it is not strong enough to be interesting for Rowlands' nonCartesian project.
- The thesis of the enacted mind, in particular Alva Noe's sensorimotor version of it, is also rejected as being either implausible or no stronger than the thesis of the embedded mind (81 & 82).
- First I will outline Rowlands' defense of the thesis of the amalgamated mind, then I will raise some issues for further investigation.
For the full text of the penultimate draft, see Madary - Review of Mark Rowlands' 'The New Science of the Mind'.
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