Replication Ethics
Kent (Adrian)
Source: Arxiv.org, January 8, 2019
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. Suppose some future technology enables the same consciously experienced human life to be repeated, identically or nearly so, N times, in series or in parallel.
  2. Is this roughly N times as valuable as enabling the same life once, because each life has value and values are additive? Or is it of roughly equal value as enabling the life once, because only one life is enabled, albeit in a physically unusual way? Does it matter whether the lives are contemporaneous or successive?
  3. We argue that these questions highlight a hitherto neglected facet of population ethics that may become relevant in the not necessarily far distant future.

Comment:

For the full text, see Kent - Replication Ethics.

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