Presentism without Presentness
Correia (Fabrice) & Rosenkranz (Sven)
Source: Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 2015, 4 (1), 19–27
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsDisclaimer


Authors’ Abstract

  1. We argue that presentism, understood as a view about time and existence, can perspicuously be defined in opposition to all other familiar contenders without appeal to any notion of presentness or cognate notions such as concreteness.
  2. Given recent worries about the suitability of such notions to cut much metaphysical ice, this should be welcomed by presentism’s defenders.
  3. We also show that, irrespective of its sparse ideology, the proposed formulation forestalls any deviant interpretation at odds with the view it aims to capture.

Comment:

Downloaded from academia.edu, 9th September 2019

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



© Theo Todman, June 2007 - Sept 2019. Please address any comments on this page to theo@theotodman.com. File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page