'Beyond A- and B-Time' Reconsidered
Deng (Natalja)
Source: Philosophia 38/4: 741-753, Dec. 2010
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. This article is a response to Clifford Williams’s claim that the debate between A- and B theories of time is misconceived because these theories do not differ.
  2. I provide some missing support for Williams’s claim that the B-theory includes transition, by arguing that representative B-theoretic explanations for why we experience time as passing (even though it does not) are inherently unstable.
  3. I then argue that, contra Williams, it does not follow that there is nothing at stake in the A- versus B debate.


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