On Explaining Why Time Seems to Pass
Deng (Natalja)
Source: Southern Journal of Philosophy 51/3: 367-382, Sept. 2013
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. Usually, the B‐theory of time is taken to involve the claim that time does not, in reality, pass; after all, on the B‐theory, nothing really becomes present and then more and more past, times do not come into existence successively, and which facts obtain does not change.
  2. For this reason, many B‐theorists have recently tried to explain away one or more aspect(s) of experience that they and their opponents take to constitute an experience of time as passing.
  3. In this paper, I examine three prominent proposals of this kind and argue that, though intriguing, the proposals undermine, to some extent, the assumption that there is an element of experience that B‐theorists need to take to be illusory.

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