Common Sense, Ontology and Time: A Critique of Lynne Rudder Baker's View of Temporal Reality
Oaklander (L. Nathan)
Source: Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas (Brazil): Vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 117-156, Oct - Dec 2016
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. The aim of this paper is twofold:
    1. First, to critically discuss Lynne Rudder’s Baker BA-theory of time, and
    2. Second to contrast it with the R-theory (after Russell).
  2. In the course of my discussion I will
    1. Contrast three different methodological approaches regarding the relation between common sense and ontology;
    2. Clarify Russell’s authentic view in contrast to the B-theory which is McTaggart’s misrepresentation of Russell, and
    3. Consider how the R-theory can respond to objections Baker makes to eternalism (as she understands it).

Comment:

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