Presentism, Passage, Phenomenology and Physicalism
Miller (Kristie) & Loo (Jane Weiling)
Source: Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas (Brazil): Vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 183-201, Oct - Dec 2016
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. Temporal dynamists argue that we should believe that there exists temporal passage because there being passage is the best explanation for the presence of our temporal phenomenology.
  2. Presentists argue that presentism is the best (and perhaps only coherent) version of temporal dynamism.
  3. Therefore, conditional on us accepting temporal dynamism, we should accept presentism.
  4. In this paper it is argued that if we understand temporal passage as the presentist does, such an argument can succeed only if dualism is true.
  5. Thus, we conclude, either presentists should embrace dualism, or they should reject any argument for presentism that proceeds via any such argument for temporal passage that proceeds via considerations of what best explains our temporal phenomenology.


For the full text, see Miller+Loo - Presentism, Passage, Phenomenology and Physicalism.

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