Fatalism as a Metaphysical Thesis
Meyer (Ulrich)
Source: Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas (Brazil): Vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 203-223, Oct - Dec 2016
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. Even though fatalism has been an intermittent topic of philosophy since Greek antiquity, this paper argues that fate ought to be of little concern to metaphysicians.
  2. Fatalism is neither an interesting metaphysical thesis in its own right, nor can it be identified with theses that are, such as realism about the future or determinism.

Comment:

For the full text, see Meyer - Fatalism as a Metaphysical Thesis.

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