Temporal Experience and Metaphysics
Peebles (Graham)
Source: Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas (Brazil): Vol. 40, no. 1, pp. 145-182, Jan - Mar 2017
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. The well-known phenomenological argument draws metaphysical conclusions about time, specifically about change through time and the resulting passage or flow of time, from our temporal experience.
  2. The argument begins with the phenomenological premise that there is a class of properties which underlies our experience of time and change through time, and its conclusion is that these properties are not merely experienced but exemplified.
  3. I argue that the phenomenological argument is best served by the adoption of a representational theory of perception.
  4. I then present a representational theory of temporal experience.

Comment:

For the full text, see Peebles - Temporal Experience and Metaphysics.

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