Anti-Metaphysicalism, Necessity, and Temporal Ontology
Balaguer (Mark)
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 92 (January 2016), pp. 145-167
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. This paper argues for a certain kind of anti-metaphysicalism about the temporal ontology debate, i.e., the debate between presentists and eternalists over the existence of past and future objects.
  2. Three different kinds of anti-metaphysicalism are defined — namely, non-factualism, physical-empiricism, and trivialism. The paper argues for the disjunction of these three views.
  3. It is then argued that trivialism is false, so that either non-factualism or physical-empiricism is true.
  4. Finally, the paper ends with a discussion of whether we should endorse non-factualism or physical-empiricism. An initial reason is provided for thinking that non-factualism might be true, but in the end, the paper leaves this question open.
  5. The paper also argues against a certain kind of necessitarianism about the temporal ontology debate; but this isn’t an extra job — the falsity of this necessitarian view falls out of the other arguments as a sort of corollary.

Comment:

For the full text, see Balaguer - Anti-Metaphysicalism, Necessity, and Temporal Ontology.

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