Conceptual analysis and x-phi
Balaguer (Mark)
Source: Synthese, vol. 193 (August 2016), pp. 2367-388
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. This paper does two things.
    1. First, it argues for a metaphilosophical view of conceptual analysis questions; in particular, it argues that the facts that settle conceptual-analysis questions are facts about the linguistic intentions of ordinary folk.
    2. The second thing this paper does is argue that if this metaphilosophical view is correct, then experimental philosophy (or “x-phi”) is a legitimate methodology to use in trying to answer conceptual-analysis questions.

Comment:

For the full text, see Balaguer - Conceptual analysis and x-phi.

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