Bringing Things About
Judisch (Neal)
Source: Hazlett (Allan) - New Waves in Metaphysics
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Introduction

  1. In this essay, I hope to dissolve a problem for naturalistic theories of human action.
  2. The problem I aim to dissolve is generated when two independently plausible theses concerning human action are combined:
    1. On the one hand, it is plausible that action consists in sequences of suitably related events - desires and beliefs give rise to mental events such as choices, or states such as intentions, which choices or intentions subsequently cause the agent's body to move in ways aimed at satisfying her goals.
    2. On the other hand, actions are distinct from 'mere happenings' in that they are brought about by the agents whose actions they are: actions are things agents do, not things that merely occur to or within their bodies.

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