Personal Identity, Substantial Change, and the Significance of Becoming
Otsuka (Michael)
Source: Erkenntnis (2018) 83:1229–1243
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. According to philosophers who ground your anticipation of future experiences in psychological continuity and connectedness1, it is rational to anticipate the experiences of someone other than yourself, such as a self that is the product of fission or of replication2.
  2. In this article, I concur that it is rational to anticipate the experiences of the product of fission while denying the rationality of anticipating the experiences of a replica.
  3. In defending my position, I offer the following explanation of why you have good reason to anticipate the experiences of your post-fission successor but not your replica: in the former case, you become (i.e., substantially change into) somebody else, whereas, in the latter case, you are merely replaced by somebody else.

Comment:

For the full text, see Otsuka - Personal Identity, Substantial Change, and the Significance of Becoming.

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  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2020
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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