Minds, Machines and Gödel
Lucas (J.R.)
Source: Philosophy, Vol. 36, No. 137 (Apr. - Jul., 1961), pp. 112-127
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Introduction

  1. Godel's Theorem seems to me to prove that Mechanism is false, that is, that minds cannot be explained as machines. So also has it seemed to many other people: almost every mathematical logician I have put the matter to has confessed to similar thoughts, but has felt reluctant to commit himself definitely until he could see the whole argument set out, with all objections fully stated and properly met.
  2. This I attempt to do.

Comment:

See "Lewis (David) - Lucas Against Mechanism", and then "Lewis (David) - Lucas Against Mechanism II" for a response.

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