- Two of the most prominent ontological theories of personal identity are Eric Olson’s animalism1 and Lynne Rudder Baker’s constitution view2.
- Whereas animalism argues that we are essentially animals and merely accidentally persons, the constitution view holds that we are essentially persons and derivatively animals.
- In my paper, I shall argue that both theories fall short. A transformative approach to personal identity, as I develop it, must avoid the dilemma of reductionism and dualism with regard to the relationship between bodily organism and person, as manifested in the debate between animalism and constitution view.
- Personal identity is not so much about the addition of properties to an animal body, but about the transformation of the animal life. The difference between animal and person is therefore not categorical or generic, but specific: personal properties are nothing additional to an animal body, but expressions of the personal life form.
Retrieved from Academia.edu, 5 August 2020
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2020
- Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)