The Hybrid Theory of Personal Identity
Kotak (Aakash)
Source: Retrieved from Academia.edu
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Conclusion

  1. Philosophers don't face a choice between the biological truism that we are human animals and the magnetic thesis that we would go with our cerebra. These central claims are reconcilable.
    1. One option is to assert that our substance kind is HUMAN ANIMAL and that cerebra can constitute humans. As we've seen, however, this stance is difficult to motivate.
    2. A second option is to assert that our substance kind is LOCKEAN PERSON and that HUMAN ANIMAL is our phase kind. But those who do so are saddled with the repugnant consequence that infants cease to exist at the onset of rationality and self-awareness.
    3. A third option is to endorse the Hybrid Theory. What I hope to have shown is that this option is loaded with promise.
  2. [Because …]
    1. For one thing, Hybrid Theorists avoid the varied difficulties brought to light by the well-known too-many-thinkers objection to neo-Lockeanism, chief among which is the epistemic problem canvassed here.
    2. For another, Hybrid Theorists can handle the potentially problematic divergence-case in a metaphysically robust way.
    3. And for yet another, Hybrid Theorists tell a superior story to both animalists and neo-Lockeans about how we come into existence and the kinds of change we can survive. This benefit in particular is well worth the ontological cost.
  3. The Hybrid Theory captures the most promising answer to the question: what are we? The task now is to add to the account by addressing two related questions:
    1. what are our persistence conditions, and
    2. What is our fundamental nature?
    Given that we have already derived facts about the kind to which the Hybrid Theorist assigns us from facts about animals and Lockean persons, I see no reason why satisfactory answers should be out of the Hybrid Theorist's reach.

Relevant Reading List (relevance indicated in footnotes)
  1. "Arnadottir (Steinvor Tholl) - Functionalism and Thinking Animals", Árnadóttir, 20101
  2. "Ayers (Michael R.) - Locke (Vol 2 - Ontology)", Ayers2
  3. "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View", Baker, 20003
  4. "Blatti (Stephan) & Snowdon (Paul), Eds - Animalism: Introduction", Baker, 20164
  5. "Berniunas (Renatas) & Dranseika (Vilius) - Folk Concepts of Person and Identity: a Response to Nichols and Bruno", Berniūnas & Dranseika, 20165
  6. "Blatti (Stephan) - A New Argument for Animalism", Blatti, 20126
  7. "Blatti (Stephan) - Headhunters", Blatti, 20167
  8. "Blatti (Stephan) & Snowdon (Paul), Eds - Animalism: Introduction", Blatti & Snowdon, 20168
  9. "Boorse (Christopher) - Wright on Functions", Boorse, 19769
  10. "Campbell (Tim) & McMahan (Jeff) - Animalism and the Varieties of Conjoined Twinning", Campbell & McMahan, 201610
  11. "Dretske (Fred) - Knowledge and the Flow of Information", Dretske, 198111
  12. "Fodor (Jerry) - Psychosemantics", Fodor, 198712
  13. "Gallois (Andre) - Occasions of Identity : a Study in the Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness", Gallois, 199813
  14. "Gillett (Carl) - What you are and the evolution of organs, souls and superorganisms: a reply to Blatti", Gillett, 201314
  15. "Hawley (Katherine) - How Things Persist", Hawley, 200115
  16. "Hawley (Katherine) - Fission, Fusion and Intrinsic Facts", Hawley, 200516
  17. "Johnston (Mark) - 'Human Beings' Revisited: My Body is Not an Animal", Johnston, 200717
  18. "Johnston (Mark) - Remnant Persons: Animalism's Undoing", Johnston, 201618
  19. "Liao (S. Matthew) - Twinning, Inorganic Replacement, and the Organism View", Liao, 201019
  20. "Locke (John), Nidditch (Peter) - An Essay Concerning Human Understanding", Locke, 197520
  21. "Madden (Rory) - Human Persistence", Madden, 2016a21
  22. "Madden (Rory) - Human Persistence", Madden, 2016b22
  23. "Millikan (Ruth Garrett) - An Input Condition for Teleosemantics? Reply to Shea (and Godfrey-Smith)", Millikan, 200723
  24. "Nichols (Shaun) & Bruno (Michael) - Intuitions about Personal Identity: An Empirical Study", Nichols & Bruno, 201024
  25. "Noonan (Harold) - The Closest Continuer Theory of Identity", Noonan, 198525
  26. "Noonan (Harold) - Animalism Versus Lockeanism: A Current Controversy", Noonan, 199826
  27. "Nozick (Robert) - Philosophical Explanations", Nozick, 198127
  28. "Olson (Eric) - Human People Or Human Animals", Olson, 199528
  29. "Olson (Eric) - Was I Ever a Fetus?", Olson, 199729
  30. "Olson (Eric) - Personal Identity", Olson, 2002a30
  31. "Olson (Eric) - Thinking Animals and the Reference of 'I'", Olson, 2002b31
  32. "Olson (Eric) - What Does Functionalism Tell Us About Personal Identity", Olson, 2002c32
  33. "Olson (Eric) - An Argument for Animalism", Olson, 200333
  34. "Olson (Eric) - Animalism and the Corpse Problem", Olson, 200434
  35. "Olson (Eric) - What are We? A Study of Personal Ontology", Olson, 200735
  36. "Olson (Eric) - The Remnant-Person Problem", Olson, 201636
  37. "Parfit (Derek) - Personal Identity", Parfit37
  38. "Parfit (Derek) - We Are Not Human Beings", Parfit, 201638
  39. "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Self, Body, and Coincidence", Shoemaker, 199939
  40. "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Persons, Animals, and Identity", Shoemaker, 200840
  41. Sydney Shoemaker (201141). On What We Are. In S. Gallagher (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self (pp. 352-71). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  42. "Snowdon (Paul) - Persons, Animals, and Ourselves", Snowdon42
  43. "Sosa (Ernest) - How Must Knowledge Be Modally Related to What Is Known?", Sosa, 199943
  44. "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Material Beings", Van Inwagen, 199044
  45. "Wright (Larry) - Functions", Wright, 197345

Comment:

Retrieved from Academia.edu, 11 August 2020



In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1: Footnote 2: Footnote 3: Footnote 4: Footnote 5: Footnote 6: Footnote 7: Footnote 8: Footnote 9: Footnote 10: Footnote 11: Footnote 12: Footnote 13: Footnote 14: Footnote 15: Footnote 16: Footnote 17: Footnote 18: Footnote 19: Footnote 20: Footnote 21: Footnote 22: Footnote 23: Footnote 24: Footnote 25: Footnote 26: Footnote 27: Footnote 28: Footnote 29: Footnote 30: Footnote 31: Footnote 32: Footnote 33: Footnote 34: Footnote 35: Footnote 36: Footnote 37: Footnote 38: Footnote 39: Footnote 40: Footnote 41:
Footnote 42: Footnote 43: Footnote 44: Footnote 45:

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2020
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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