How Must Knowledge Be Modally Related to What Is Known?
Sosa (Ernest)
Source: Philosophical Topics, Vol. 26, No. 1/2, The Philosophy of Sydney Shoemaker(Spring & Fall 1999), pp. 373-384
Paper - Abstract

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Author's Introduction

  1. Given a fact , what is needed beyond believing it, B(f), or even believing it with justification, B(f) & J(f), in order to know it?
  2. Epistemologists have turned externalist on this question in a variety of ways, all of which deem insufficient the justification traditionally derived from experience and reason.
  3. Externalists have supplemented or replaced such justification with "external" requirements beyond the contents of the subject's mind and beyond merely logical or evidential relations among propositions.
  4. What follows will examine some varieties of that approach.

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