Powers, Persistence and Process
Meincke (Anne Sophie)
Source: Forthcoming in: A. S. Meincke (ed.), Dispositionalism. Perspectives from Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science, Springer (Synthese Library)., Chapter 7
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. Stephen Mumford has argued that dispositionalists ought to be endurantists1 because perdurantism2, by breaking down persisting objects in sequences of static discrete existents, is at odds with a powers metaphysics.
  2. This has been contested by Neil Edward Williams who offers his own version of ‘powerful’ perdurance where powers function as links between the temporal parts of persisting objects.
  3. Weighing up the arguments given by both sides, I show that the profile of ‘powerful’ persistence crucially depends on how one conceptualises the processes involved in the manifestation of powers. As this turns out not to be determined per se by subscribing to some view labelled ‘powers view’, further discussion is needed as to what processes3 are and to what kind of process theory a powers metaphysics should commit itself in order to be convincing.
  4. I defend the claim that dispositionalism is best combined with a version of process ontology that is indeed incompatible with a perdurantist analysis of persistence. However, I argue that this does not imply that dispositionalists ought to be endurantists.


Retrieved from Academia.edu, 6 October 2020

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