- According to dispositional realism, or dispositionalism, the entities inhabiting our world possess irreducibly dispositional properties – often called ‘powers’ – by means of which they are sources of change. Dispositionalism has become increasingly popular among metaphysicians in the last three decades as it offers a realist account of causation1 and provides novel avenues for understanding modality, laws of nature, agency, free will2 and other key concepts in metaphysics.
- At the same time, dispositionalism is receiving growing interest among philosophers of science. This reflects the substantial role scientific findings play in arguments for dispositionalism which, as a metaphysics of science, aims to elucidate the very foundations of science.
- In this introductory chapter, I give an overview of the state of the debate and explain the twofold aim of the present collection of essays which is
- To explore the ontological commitments of dispositionalism and
- To discuss these against the background of latest scientific research, by bringing together perspectives from both metaphysics and the philosophy of science.
- I finally provide a summary of this intellectual journey.
- Retrieved from Academia.edu, 6 October 2020
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