Do Human Embryos Have a Disposition to Personhood?
Meincke (Anne Sophie)
Source: Der manipulierbare Embryo: Potentialitäts und Speziesargumente auf dem Prüfstand, ed. by M. Hähnel, M. Rothhaar & R. Kipke, Münster: Mentis, 147-171
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsDisclaimer

Author’s Abstract

  1. Do human embryos have a disposition to personhood? This has been argued within recent attempts to reformulate the classical argument from potentiality for the protection of human embryos with the help of the concept of disposition.
  2. In this paper, I analyse the central ontological premise of this new approach and show that any hopes of rehabilitating in dispositionalist terms the idea of a potential to personhood inherent in human embryos are mistaken.
  3. The dispositionalist version of the potentiality argument navigates in same metaphysical waters as its predecessor and, hence, collides just the same with biological facts concerning human embryogenesis.


Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2020
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)

© Theo Todman, June 2007 - Oct 2020. Please address any comments on this page to File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page