Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism
Lowe (E.J.)
Source: Chapter 2 of Benedikt Paul Gocke, After Physicalism, 2012
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Introduction

  1. Non-Cartesian substance dualism is a position in the philosophy of mind concerning the nature of the mind-body relation — or, more exactly, the person-body relation. It maintains that this is a relationship between two distinct, but not necessary separable, individual substances, in the sense of ‘individual substance’ according to which this term denotes a persisting, concrete object or bearer of properties, capable of undergoing change in respect of at least some of those properties as time passes. When such an object undergoes such a change, it undergoes a change of state, for a state of an object consists in its possession of some property at a time, or during a period of time. Using a more traditional terminology, we may speak of these states as modes of the object or individual substance in question.
  2. As we shall see, non-Cartesian substance dualism differs from its more familiar cousin, Cartesian substance dualism, with regard to the class of modes that it considers persons — as opposed to their bodies — to be capable of possessing. Therefore, it takes a different view concerning what kind of individual substance a person — or, more generally, a subject of experience — should be taken to be. More precisely, whereas Cartesian substance dualism takes subjects of experience to be necessarily immaterial and indeed nonphysical substances, non-Cartesian substance dualism does not insist on this.
  3. As we shall also see, this distinctive feature of non-Cartesian substance dualism gives it certain advantages over Cartesian dualism, without compelling it to forfeit any of the intuitive appeal that attaches to its more traditional rival.

Comment:

For the full text, see Lowe - Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism

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