- Non-Cartesian substance dualism is a position in the philosophy of mind concerning the nature of the mind-body relation — or, more exactly, the person-body relation. It maintains that this is a relationship between two distinct, but not necessary separable, individual substances, in the sense of ‘individual substance’ according to which this term denotes a persisting, concrete object or bearer of properties, capable of undergoing change in respect of at least some of those properties as time passes. When such an object undergoes such a change, it undergoes a change of state, for a state of an object consists in its possession of some property at a time, or during a period of time. Using a more traditional terminology, we may speak of these states as modes of the object or individual substance in question.
- As we shall see, non-Cartesian substance dualism differs from its more familiar cousin, Cartesian substance dualism, with regard to the class of modes that it considers persons — as opposed to their bodies — to be capable of possessing. Therefore, it takes a different view concerning what kind of individual substance a person — or, more generally, a subject of experience — should be taken to be. More precisely, whereas Cartesian substance dualism takes subjects of experience to be necessarily immaterial and indeed nonphysical substances, non-Cartesian substance dualism does not insist on this.
- As we shall also see, this distinctive feature of non-Cartesian substance dualism gives it certain advantages over Cartesian dualism, without compelling it to forfeit any of the intuitive appeal that attaches to its more traditional rival.
For the full text, see Lowe - Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism
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