Aristotle’s Hylomorphism without Reconditioning
Marmodoro (Anna)
Source: Philosophical Inquiry Vol 36, Nos. 1-2, pp. 5-22, 2013
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. A number of contemporary philosophers have recently argued that Aristotle’s hylomorphism1 and its neo-Aristotelian versions need to be ‘reconditioned’ in order to be philosophically viable.
  2. In the first part of this paper, I argue that these arguments in fact target only mereological hylomorphism2, which is not Aristotle’s; additionally, I submit, the proposed reconditioning opens up as many problems as it aims to solve.
  3. If mereological hylomorphism3, as well as reconditioned mereological hylomorphism4, are shown to be prey to difficulties, this is an important albeit indirect conclusion in support of Aristotle’s hylomorphism5 in its own right: I examine the metaphysical status of matter and form, and the unity of substance.
  4. I conclude that Aristotle’s hylomorphism6 stands in need of no reconditioning, contrary to what others have recently argued.


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