Dualism Intact
Swinburne (Richard)
Source: Faith and Philosophy, Vol. 13, No. 1, January 1996, pp. 68-77
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsBooks / Papers Citing this PaperDisclaimer


Author’s Abstract

  1. I have argued in many places that a carefully articulated version of Descartes' argument to show that he is essentially an immaterial soul is sound. It is conceivable that I who am currently conscious continue to exist without my body, and that can only be if there is currently a non-bodily part of me which alone is essential for me.
  2. Recent counter-arguments of Alston and Smythe, Moser and van der Nat, Zimmerman, and Shoemaker are rejected.

Comment:

For the full text, see Swinburne - Dualism Intact

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2020
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



© Theo Todman, June 2007 - Oct 2020. Please address any comments on this page to theo@theotodman.com. File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page