Moral Relativism: A Causal Interpretation and Defense
Sapontzis (Steve F.)
Source: American Philosophical Quarterly , Oct., 1987, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Oct., 1987), pp. 329-337
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

This paper contains three sections.

  1. The first develops a conception of moral relativism which is defensible and significant for philosophical discussions of the subject. This conception I call "origin relativism."
  2. The second section is devoted to discussing how three traditional objections to moral relativism do and do not apply to origin relativism.
  3. The concluding section sets out and briefly defends an argument for believing that origin relativism is true.

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  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2021
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