Author’s Conclusion
- In this thesis, I have argued that it is unreasonable to believe that the following propositions are true simultaneously:
- We are human organisms.
- For any organism O1 at a time, t1, and for any organism O2 at a time, t2, O1 and O2 are identical if and only if the simples that compose O1 and the simples that compose O2 are constituents of the same life.
- We will die.
- We will exist (after our deaths) on the Last Day.
- I argued for this thesis as follows.
- First, I demonstrated why, in the past, it has been argued that it is unreasonable to believe that (1)–(4) are true simultaneously. It has been argued that it is unreasonable to believe that (1)–(4) are true simultaneously because propositions (A) and (B) are, supposedly, true.
- Necessarily, the life of an organism, O1, at one time, t1, is identical with the life of an organism, O2, at another time, t2, if and only if, the simples that compose O1 and the simples that compose O2 are immanent-causally connected.
and
- Necessarily, when we die the simples that last composed us will cease to bear any immanent-causal connection to any organism.
- Second, however, I demonstrated that (A) and (B) are false. (A) and (B) are false, I have argued, because there are possible worlds at which not-(a) and not-(b) are true.
- Third, I argued that while (A) and (B) may be false their non-modal forms (a) and (b) are highly plausible. If one rejects (a) then one has to, for example, reject the ‘only x and y’ principle. If one rejects (b) then one has to, for example, deny an obvious truth: our remains will rot or will be burned.
- In the light of this, I argued that while it is not impossible (provided modal scepticism is false) for an organism that has died to exist again on the Last Day, it is still unreasonable to believe that an organism that has died can exist again on the Last Day.
- I then argued that it is the task of the Christian materialist to demonstrate that this is not the case. Indeed, van Inwagen’s argument, as it stands, will probably not satisfy either the atheist who argues that there is no actual resurrection (because materialism is true) or the Christian substance dualist who argues that materialism is actually false (because life after death is true). This is not because the atheist and the Christian are modal sceptics. Rather, it is because they have good reasons to doubt that van Inwagen’s suggestion may well be actual, and so have good reasons to doubt that the resurrection of material beings is a feat the almighty being may well achieve.
- Overall, I hope to have moved the argument concerning the possibility of life after death given animalism away from its early ‘logical’ stage on to the, much more interesting, ‘plausibility’ stage. I say the ‘much more interesting’ plausibility stage because, of course, this is the charge that Christian substance dualists will likely bring against the Christian materialist. Although it may be possible for an organism that has died to exist again on the Last Day it is still not reasonable to believe that an organism that has died can exist again on the Last Day.
Dualism in Scripture
- The aim of Atkinson’s Thesis is to demonstrate that Animalism is inconsistent with the Christian hope of resurrection. This is a two-edged sword, depending on whether or not Animalism is true (or the Christian hope, for that matter). Atkinson thinks that – because the Christian hope is true – Animalism must be false. The faithless would argue that because Animalism is true, the Christian hope is groundless. The Thesis itself is intended as a valid ad hominem argument addressed to Christian materialists.
- I’m not clear whether Atkinson is a dualist out of conviction or because he needs to be so because he’s a Christian and thinks the Bible (and Tradition) tells him to believe it.
- I agree that Christian tradition is very strongly dualist.
- I disagree with some of Atkinson’s objections to Christian Materialists. He implies that they associate dualism with gnostic cults and other heretics. This is not so – or not primarily so or need not be so! Christian materialists are trying to argue that dualism got into the air in NT times and thereafter because of Greek – particularly Neoplatonic – influence, which is foreign to Hebrew thought. So, the NT might use these categories without necessarily endorsing them.
- He cites various OT & NT Scriptures1 that he thinks settle the matter:-
- Ecclesiastes 12:7
- Then the dust will return to the earth as it was, and the spirit will return to God who gave it.
- καὶ ἐπιστρέψῃ ὁ χοῦς ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν ὡς ἦν καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα ἐπιστρέψῃ πρὸς τὸν θεόν ὃς ἔδωκεν αὐτό
- וְיָשֹׁ֧ב הֶעָפָ֛ר עַל־הָאָ֖רֶץ כְּשֶׁהָיָ֑ה וְהָר֣וּחַ תָּשׁ֔וּב אֶל־הָאֱלֹהִ֖ים אֲשֶׁ֥ר נְתָנָֽהּ׃
- Matthew 10:28
- And do not fear those who kill the body, but are unable to kill the soul; but rather fear Him who is able to destroy both soul and body in hell.
- Καὶ μὴ φοβεῖσθε ἀπὸ τῶν ἀποκτεννόντων τὸ σῶμα, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν μὴ δυναμένων ἀποκτεῖναι· φοβεῖσθε δὲ μᾶλλον τὸν δυνάμενον καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα ἀπολέσαι ἐν γεέννῃ.
- Luke 16:22-28 (The Rich man and Lazarus)
- Luke 23:43
- And He said to him, "Truly I say to you, today you shall be with Me in Paradise."
- καὶ εἶπεν αὐτῷ· ἀμήν σοι λέγω, σήμερον μετ᾽ ἐμοῦ ἔσῃ ἐν τῷ παραδείσῳ.
- John 19:30
- When Jesus therefore had received the sour wine, He said, "It is finished!" And He bowed His head, and gave up His spirit.
- ὅτε οὖν ἔλαβεν τὸ ὄξος [ὁ] Ἰησοῦς εἶπεν· τετέλεσται, καὶ κλίνας τὴν κεφαλὴν παρέδωκεν τὸ πνεῦμα.
- 2 Corinthians 5:1-9
- 5:1 For we know that if the earthly tent which is our house is torn down, we have a building from God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens.
- Οἴδαμεν γὰρ ὅτι ἐὰν ἡ ἐπίγειος ἡμῶν οἰκία τοῦ σκήνους καταλυθῇ, οἰκοδομὴν ἐκ θεοῦ ἔχομεν, οἰκίαν ἀχειροποίητον αἰώνιον ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς.
- 5:6 Therefore, being always of good courage, and knowing that while we are at home in the body we are absent from the Lord--
- Θαρροῦντες οὖν πάντοτε καὶ εἰδότες ὅτι ἐνδημοῦντες ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐκδημοῦμεν ἀπὸ τοῦ κυρίου·
- Philippians 1:20-24
- 1:20 according to my earnest expectation and hope, that I shall not be put to shame in anything, but that with all boldness, Christ shall even now, as always, be exalted in my body, whether by life or by death.
- κατὰ τὴν ἀποκαραδοκίαν καὶ ἐλπίδα μου, ὅτι ἐν οὐδενὶ αἰσχυνθήσομαι ἀλλ᾽ ἐν πάσῃ παρρησίᾳ ὡς πάντοτε καὶ νῦν μεγαλυνθήσεται Χριστὸς ἐν τῷ σώματί μου, εἴτε διὰ ζωῆς εἴτε διὰ θανάτου.
- Hebrews 12:22-23
- 12:23 to the general assembly and church of the first-born who are enrolled in heaven, and to God, the Judge of all, and to the spirits of righteous men made perfect,
- πανηγύρει καὶ ἐκκλησίᾳ πρωτοτόκων ἀπογεγραμμένων ἐν οὐρανοῖς καὶ κριτῇ θεῷ πάντων καὶ πνεύμασιν δικαίων τετελειωμένων
- 1 Peter 3:18-20
- 3:18 For Christ also died for sins once for all, the just for the unjust, in order that He might bring us to God, having been put to death in the flesh, but made alive in the spirit;
- ὅτι καὶ Χριστὸς ἅπαξ περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν ἔπαθεν, δίκαιος ὑπὲρ ἀδίκων, ἵνα ὑμᾶς προσαγάγῃ τῷ θεῷ θανατωθεὶς μὲν σαρκί, ζῳοποιηθεὶς δὲ πνεύματι·
- Revelation 6:9-11
- 6:9 And when He broke the fifth seal, I saw underneath the altar the souls of those who had been slain because of the word of God, and because of the testimony which they had maintained;
BGT Revelation 6:9 Καὶ ὅτε ἤνοιξεν τὴν πέμπτην σφραγῖδα, εἶδον ὑποκάτω τοῦ θυσιαστηρίου τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν ἐσφαγμένων διὰ τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ διὰ τὴν μαρτυρίαν ἣν εἶχον.
- 6:11 And there was given to each of them a white robe; and they were told that they should rest for a little while longer, until the number of their fellow servants and their brethren who were to be killed even as they had been, should be completed also.
BGT Revelation 6:11 καὶ ἐδόθη αὐτοῖς ἑκάστῳ στολὴ λευκὴ καὶ ἐρρέθη αὐτοῖς ἵνα ἀναπαύσονται ἔτι χρόνον μικρόν, ἕως πληρωθῶσιν καὶ οἱ σύνδουλοι αὐτῶν καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ αὐτῶν οἱ μέλλοντες ἀποκτέννεσθαι ὡς καὶ αὐτοί.
- Revelation 20:4
- And I saw thrones, and they sat upon them, and judgment was given unto them: and I saw the souls of them that were beheaded for the witness of Jesus, and for the word of God, and which had not worshipped the beast, neither his image, neither had received his mark upon their foreheads, or in their hands; and they lived and reigned with Christ a thousand years.
- Καὶ εἶδον θρόνους καὶ ἐκάθισαν ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς καὶ κρίμα ἐδόθη αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν πεπελεκισμένων διὰ τὴν μαρτυρίαν Ἰησοῦ καὶ διὰ τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ οἵτινες οὐ προσεκύνησαν τὸ θηρίον οὐδὲ τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐκ ἔλαβον τὸ χάραγμα ἐπὶ τὸ μέτωπον καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν χεῖρα αὐτῶν. καὶ ἔζησαν καὶ ἐβασίλευσαν μετὰ τοῦ Χριστοῦ χίλια ἔτη.
- My response to these passages is – necessarily briefly – as follows:-
- Ecclesiastes 12:7
- This passage treats the ‘spirit’ as a life-force that returns to God when an organism dies. Human beings and other animals are on a par in Ecclesiastes in this regard.
- Matthew 10:28
- Difficult to read this without dualist spectacles. Note, incidentally, that the soul – whatever it is – is destroyed. But it is evidently distinct from the body.
- Luke 16:22-28 (The Rich man and Lazarus)
- Luke 23:43
- John 19:30
- 2 Corinthians 5:1-9
- Philippians 1:20-24
- Hebrews 12:22-23
- 1 Peter 3:18-20
- Revelation 6:9-11
- Revelation 20:4
Reading List2
- Paul C. Anders 2011. ‘Mind, Mortality and Material Being: Van Inwagen and the Dilemma of Material Survival of Death’. Sophia 50 (1): 25–37. Can’t find a free copy on-line3!
- "Atkinson (Thomas) - A Reply to Anders’ ‘Mind, Mortality and Material Being: van Inwagen and the Dilemma of Material Survival of Death’": 2015.
- "Atkinson (Thomas) - Conceivability, Possibility and the Resurrection of Material Beings": 2016.
- "Bahnsen (Greg) - The Mind/Body Problem In Biblical Perspective": 1972. Not explicitly cited by me.
- "Bailey (Andrew M.) - Animalism": 2015. Not explicitly cited by me.
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Need a Christian be a Mind/Body Dualist?": 1995.
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and the Metaphysics of Resurrection": 2007. Cited as … ‘Persons and the Metaphysics of Resurrection’. Religious Studies 43 (3): 333.
- "Beebe (James R.) - Logical Problem of Evil": 2016. Not explicitly cited by me4.
- "Bedau (Mark A.) - The Nature of Life": 2014. Not explicitly cited by me.
- "Blatti (Stephan) - Animalism (SEP)": Summer 2014. Cited as … SEP: Blatti - Animalism.
- "Bynum (Caroline) - Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity, 200 - 1336": 1995.
- "Chalmers (David) - Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?": 2002. Not explicitly cited by me.
- "Clegg (James S.) - Cryptobiosis — a Peculiar State of Biological Organization": 2001. Not explicitly cited by me.
- "Cooper (John) - Body, Soul and Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-dualism Debate": 1989.
- "Corcoran (Kevin) - Physical Persons and Postmortem Survival Without Temporal Gaps": 2001a.
- "Corcoran (Kevin), Ed. - Soul, Body and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons": 2001b.
- "Corcoran (Kevin) - Rethinking Human Nature: A Christian Materialist Alternative to the Soul": 2006.
- "Davis (Stephen T.) - Physicalism and Resurrection": 2001.
- Trent Dougherty. 2006 (18th February). ‘van Inwagen on Possibility’. The Prosblogion. (defunct5).
- "Duncan (Matt) - A Challenge to Anti-Criterialism": 2014.
- "Eberl (Jason T.) - Potentiality, Possibility, and the Irreversibility of Death": 2008. Not explicitly cited by me..
- "Geirsson (Heimir) - Conceivability and Defeasible Modal Justification": 2005. Not explicitly cited by me..
- "Gendler (Tamar Szabo) - Personal Identity and Thought Experiments": 2002.
- "Gilmore (Cody) - When Do Things Die": 2013. Not explicitly cited by me.
- "Green (Joel B.) - Body, Soul, and Human Life: The Nature of Humanity in the Bible": 2008. Not explicitly cited by me.
- "Hartl (Peter) - Modal scepticism, Yablo-style conceivability, and analogical reasoning": 2016. Not explicitly cited by me.
- "Hasker (William) - The Emergent Self": 1999. Not explicitly cited by me.
- "Hawke (Peter) - Van Inwagen's modal skepticism": 2011. Not explicitly cited by me.
- "Hershenov (David) - Van Inwagen, Zimmerman, and the Materialist Conception of Resurrection": 2002.
- "Hershenov (David) - The Metaphysical Problem of Intermittent Existence and the Possibility of Resurrection": 2003.
- "Hudson (Hud) - A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person": 2001.
- "Johansson (Jens) - What is Animalism?": 2007.
- "Johnston (Mark) - Surviving Death": 2010.
- "Keilin (David) - The problem of anabiosis or latent life: history and current concept": 1959. Not explicitly cited by me.
- "Kung (Peter) - Imagining as a Guide to Possibility": 2010. Not explicitly cited by me.
- Peter Kung. 2016a. ‘Thought Experiments in Ethics6’. In Knowledge through Imagination, edited by Amy Kind and Peter Kung, 227–346. New York: Oxford University Press.
- "Kung (Peter) - You Really Do Imagine It: Against Error Theories of Imagination": 2016b. Not explicitly cited by me.
- Brian Leftow. 2015. ‘Against Materialist Christology’. In Christian Philosophy of Religion: Essays in Honor of Stephen T. Davis, edited by C. P. Ruloff, 65–94. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
- "Lewis (David) - Evil For Freedom's Sake?": 1993a. Not explicitly cited by me7.
- "Lewis (David) - Many, But Almost One": 1993b.
- "Licon (Jimmy Alfonso) - You’re an Animal, Plain and Simple": 2014. Not explicitly cited by me.
- "Locke (John) - Of Identity and Diversity": Locke, John. 1979.
- "Loose (Jonathan) - Constitution and the Falling Elevator: The Continuing Incompatibility of Materialism and Resurrection Belief": 2012.
- "Loose (Jonathan) - Materialism Most Miserable The Prospects for Dualist and Physicalist Accounts of Resurrection": 2018. Not explicitly cited by me.
- Jonathan Loose, Angus J.L. Mengue, and J.P. Moreland, eds. 2018. The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism8. Oxford, UK: Wiley Blackwell.
- "Luper (Steven) - The Philosophy of Death": 2009.
- "MacBride (Fraser) - Relations": 2016. Not explicitly cited by me.
- "Mackie (David) - Personal Identity and Dead People": 1999.
- "Mackie (J.L.) - The Miracle of Theism: Arguments for and against the Existence of God": 1982.
- Colin McGinn. 2004. Mindsight: Image, Dream, Meaning. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- "Merricks (Trenton) - There Are No Criteria For Identity Over Time": 1998.
- "Merricks (Trenton) - How to Live Forever Without Saving Your Soul: Physicalism and Immortality": 2001.
- "Merricks (Trenton) - Objects and Persons": 2006.
- "Noonan (Harold) - The Only X and Y Principle": 1985.
- "Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology": 1999.
- "Olson (Eric) - What are We? A Study of Personal Ontology": 2007.
- "Olson (Eric) - Immanent Causation and Life After Death": 2010.
- "Olson (Eric) - The Person and the Corpse": 2013.
- "Olson (Eric) - What Does It Mean To Say That We Are Animals?": 2015.
- "Olson (Eric) - The Role of the Brainstem in Personal Identity": 2016.
- Ingmar Persson. 1995. ‘What Is Mysterious about Death?’ Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (4): 499–508. I don’t have this paper and can’t find it free on-line.
- "Plantinga (Alvin) - God, Freedom and Evil": 1974. Not explicitly cited by me9.
- "Plantinga (Alvin) - The Nature of Necessity": 1978.
- "Pruss (Alexander R.) - Omnipresence, Multilocation, the Real Presence and Time Travel": 2013. Not explicitly cited by me.
- "Shewmon (D. Alan) - The Brain and Somatic Integration: Insights Into the Standard Biological Rationale for Equating “Brain Death” With Death": 2001.
- "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Personal Identity: a Materialist Account": 1984.
- "Snowdon (Paul) - Persons, Animals, Ourselves": 2014.
- "Sturch (Richard) - Games of Cricket and the General Resurrection": 2015. Not explicitly cited by me.
- "Thornton (Allison Krile) - Varieties of Animalism": 2016. Not explicitly cited by me.
- Thurrow, Josh. n.d. ‘Animals with Soul’. I’ve not been able to determine who this person is, nor find this paper.
- "Toner (Patrick) - Hylemorphism, remnant persons and personhood": 2014. Not explicitly cited by me.
- "Tzinman (Rina) - Against the Brainstem View of the Persistence of Human Animals": 2016.
- "Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Possibility of Resurrection": 1978.
- "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Philosophers and the Words 'Human Body'": 1980.
- "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Material Beings": 1990.
- "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Metaphysics": 1993a.
- "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Précis of Material Beings": 1993b.
- "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Reply to Reviewers": 1993c.
- "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Dualism and Materialism: Athens and Jerusalem?": 1995.
- "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Modal Epistemology": 1998a.
- Peter Van Inwagen. 2006. The Problem of Evil: The Gifford Lectures Delivered in the University of St. Andrews in 2003. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Not explicitly cited by me10.
- "Van Inwagen (Peter) - A Materialist Ontology of the Human Person": 2007.
- "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Causation and the mental": 2014a.
- "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Existence: Essays In Ontology": 2014b.
- "Van Inwagen (Peter) - I Look for the Resurrection of the Dead and the Life of the World to Come": 2015.
- "Wilkes (Kathleen) - Real People: Personal Identity Without Thought Experiments": 1993.
- "Wilson (Jack) - Biological Individuality - The identity and Persistence of Living Entities": 1999.
- "Yablo (Stephen) - Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?": 1993.
- "Zimmerman (Dean) - Immanent Causation": 1997.
- "Zimmerman (Dean) - The Compatibility of Materialism and Survival: The “Falling Elevator” Model": 1999. Also in Oxford Readings in Philosophical Theology, 2:328–46. Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press.
- "Zimmerman (Dean) - Bodily Resurrection: The Falling Elevator Model Revisited": 2010.
- "Zimmerman (Dean) - Personal Identity and the Survival of Death": 2013.
Comment:
In-Page Footnotes
Footnote 1:
- I’ve taken the references – or sometimes only the main part of them – from BibleWorks. I should probably have used the NIV rather than ASB as the English text, but it’s not really important.
Footnote 2:
- It’s rather an onerous task checking this lot out, and acquiring – or seeking to acquire – those papers I’ve not got. But this is a very important thesis from my perspective and so is worth the bother.
- I’ve remarked on those papers that aren’t on my reading list, which can be for several reasons:-
- I have the book that the paper is contained in, and the book is cited.
- I have the paper, but don’t think it’s worth citing.
- I have the paper but have omitted to cite it by accident.
- I didn’t have the paper, but have acquired it based on its citation in this paper, and will cite it in due course.
- I don’t have the paper, and can’t find it (free) on-line.
Footnote 3:
- The author spends a lot of time addressing this paper, so it’s disappointing not to have the original.
Footnotes 4, 7, 9, 10:
- This work – like several others – is cited for the form of argument displayed, and is otherwise irrelevant to Atkinson’s – and my – thesis. So, I won’t be citing it!
Footnote 5:
- The Prosblogion expired later in 2018, but has recently been resurrected! See The Prosblogion. However, this paper doesn’t seem to be there, or anywhere else.
- I note that Trent Dougherty left Baylor university under a cloud and is no longer in academia: see Daily Nous: Trent Dougherty.
Footnote 6:
- I can’t find this book-chapter free on-line.
- The abstract is: “Counterexample thought experiments (CTEs) play a prominent role in the ethics literature. A wide range of ethics CTEs have a distinctive feature: they feature forced choices with fixed outcomes. This feature matters because, according to a generally accepted understanding of CTEs’ role in philosophical methodology, CTEs work by presenting genuinely possible scenarios. This chapter argues that imagining CTEs gives us no reason to believe that forced choices with fixed outcomes are genuine possibilities. To provide data for theorizing, CTEs must thus describe more realistic scenarios: they cannot abstract away from the fact that choices have many possible outcomes. Good thought experiments will also promise no guarantees. This means that any ethical view that counts outcomes as ethically relevant will have to take seriously moral risk. This consideration must be built into the foundation of our ethical theorizing, not just added as an afterthought once we have crafted our ethical theories.” .
Footnote 8:
- This looks an interesting book, but is far too expensive in hardback, at £150, and still expensive in paperback, which isn’t available until September 2023, at £42.
- Eventually I found the book on-line. See Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism.
- I doubt this is legal – it must break copyright rules. You can download stuff in return for uploading other stuff. All very dodgy. But I might resort to reading on-line if it’s still there when I get round to it. Copy and paste doesn’t work.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2023
- Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)